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TORTS
COMMENT
ABOLITION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN WASHINGTON

The King, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of
thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing; in him is
no folly or weakness.'
The legislature has apparently abolished the operation of the ancient
doctrine of sovereign immunity in Washington with a recently enacted
statute.' This abolition may be partial, however, and its full effect
cannot be predicted with certainty. Much of this uncertainty is caused
by the history of sovereign immunity, both in the State of Washington
and elsewhere.
It is doubtful that any nation has been so committed to the realization of individual justice as the United States. Thus the Supreme
Court's early rejection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia' is not surprising.4 Yet the Chisholm case caused such
a storm of protest among the states that in 1798 the eleventh amendment to the Constitution was introduced and ratified.5 This amendment, although confined on its face to federal court power over private
prosecutions against states,6 restored the doctrine in its full vigor.' In
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 246 (17th ed. 1830). Professor Borchard points out
that in reality the king was considered capable of wrong. Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1926). His acts were regarded as
wrongs and his obligation to right them was the same as that of a private person.
The difference was in the remedy. If the king did not act fairly he was considered to
be acting as the servant of the Devil and was subject to punishment by his religious
superiors, possibly the Pope or Council. The king, then, seldom refused to redress a
wrong. See Borchard, supra at 22-23. Professor Borchard explains, furthermore, that
this relief against the king should be considered "legal" even though it was not enforced through the courts. Borchard supra, at 24.
'Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 136.
32 U.S. (DalI.) 419 (1793).
4 Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 4-5 (1924), states that:
"Nothing seems more clear than that this immunity of the king from the jurisdiction
of the king's courts was purely personal. How it came to be applied in the United
States of America, where the prerogative is unknown, is one of the mysteries of legal
evolution.... It is beyond doubt that the Executive in the United States is not historically the sovereign, and the legislature, which is perhaps the depository of the widest
powers, is restrained by constitutional limitations. The federal government is one of
delegated powers and the states are not sovereign, according to the Constitution, as
demonstrated forcibly by the Civil War and the resulting amendments. That brings us
to the only remaining alternative, that sovereignty resides in the American electorate
or the people."
5 CUSHMAN,

LEADING

CONSTITUTIONAL

DECISIONS 263 (9th ed. 1950); Carrow,

Sovereign Immunity in Administrative Law--A New Diagnosis, 9 J. PuB. L. 1, 6
(1960); Note, 40 MINN. L. REV. 234, 236 (1929).
6 See Carrow, supra note 5, at 6-7.
7 Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1926).
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subsequent cases concerning federal and state liability, the principle
was accepted without discussing the reasons for it.' The first real
attempt to justify it appeared in Kawananakoa v. Polybank,9 a 1907
opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes.
Despite its questionable origin,'0 virtually all of the states currently
recognize sovereign immunity, although many have modified it to avoid
the harshness of its strict application." Even states having constitutional provisions granting sovereign immunity 2 have been able to provide means by which those injured by the government can obtain legal
relief.' Still, with the possible exception of Washington,' New York
seems to be the only state that has provided for a general waiver of
sovereign immunity by statute."
The courts' stubborn perpetuation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the governmental-proprietary dichotomy is surprising in
view of the numerous criticisms which have been directed against them
by writers 0 and courts." In a widely quoted article the writers observe:
If one seeks to discover the reasons for this reluctance to do what
nearly everyone agrees ought to be done, he finds three factors nearly
always present: (1) an amorphous mass of cumbrous language
8 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882).

9 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). "[T]here can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends."
10 See notes 1 and 4 supra.
"1 See Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1363
(1954).
2
Aabama, Arkansas, Illinois, and West Virginia. 33 Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 11, at 1407.
4
' Perhaps Washington's new statute, the subject of this Comment, will provide a
general waiver of sovereign immunity, even in the case of its political subdivisions.
15 Carrow, supra note 5, at 9.
16 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. App. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89, 90-91 (1959). Some of the more important articles that have been written are: Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3) 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925),
(pts. 4-6) 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927) ; Carrow, supra note 5; Fuller &
Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1941) ; Green,
Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REv. 355 (1944) ; Harno, Tort Immunity of
Municipal Corporations,4 ILL L.Q. 28 (1921) ; James, Tort Liability of Governmental
Units and 77teir Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 610 (1955) ; Tooke, Jute Extension of
Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 VA. L. REv. 97 (1932). Many of the articles criticizing
the doctrine of sovereign immunity are discussed in Repko, American. Legal Commeintary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 214 (1942).
'7 One striking example is Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65
(1955), in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented that for the Court to read the
governmental-proprietary distinction into the Federal Tort Claims Act "would thus
push the courts into the 'non-governmental'-'governmental' quagmire that has long
plagued the law of municipal corporations. A comparative study of the cases of the
forty-eight States will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More than that, the decisions
in each of the States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts
try to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound. The fact of the matter is that
the theory whereby municipalities are made amenable to liability is an endeavor, however awkward and contradictory, to escape from the basic historical doctrine of sovereign immunity."
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within itself and is always contradicted by such modem legal facts as
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the laws of most civilized nations other
than our own, the New York law and lesser reforms in most of the
other American states; (2) legislative and judicial inertia, which is
probably the most potent single explanation that anyone can give as to
why the American law is what it is; and (3) financial fears, that the
states and their subdivisions actually cannot afford in the face of other
more urgent demands upon their treasuries, to pay out what they would
be required to pay if tort liability were accepted.18
Despite these inhibitions there has been a growing trend toward
limiting the doctrine of sovereign immunity.19 The first decision to substantially limit it was Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach." In the
Hargrove case a widow sued the city for damages for the wrongful
death of her husband who died of smoke suffocation while locked in an
unattended jail. Holding that the widow could maintain her action, the
court boldly asserted:
In applying this theory the courts have transposed into our democratic system the concept that the sovereign is divine and that divinity
is beyond reproach. In preserving the theory they seem to have overlooked completely the wrongs that produced our Declaration of Independence and in the ultimate resulted in the Revolutionary War. We,
therefore, feel that the time has arrived to declare this doctrine
anachoristic [sic] not only to our system2of justice but to our traditional concepts of democratic government. 1
While the Hargrove case has been followed only in the case of municipal corporations,22 in two recent decisions other courts have apparently
abolished sovereign immunity altogether. The first of these was Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302,23 a 1959 Illinois decision.
In that case a school boy, injured in a school bus accident, brought suit
against the school district.24
The court first observed that it had not reconsidered and re-evaluated
the doctrine for over fifty years, but that during that time the subject
had received exhaustive treatment by legal writers and scholars, almost
unanimously condemning the immunity doctrine. 5 Observing also that
Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 11, at 1363-64.
19 See PROSSER, TORTS, 775 (2d ed. 1955) ; Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 11.
20 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
21 Id. at 132.
22 See Smith v. Duval County Welfare Bd., 118 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 1960) ; Buck v.
McLean, 115 So. 2d 764, 767 (Fla. 1959).
1I

23

18 Ill. App. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).

Id. at 90. Although the Kaneland school district carried insurance and thus under
Illinois law had waived immunity in the amount of the policy, in order that his recovery
would not be limited to that amount, plaintiff purposely did not allege the existence of
such insurance.
25 See articles cited note 16 supra.
24

1961]

WASHINGTON LEGISLATION-1961

during that period numerous legislative and judicial efforts to alleviate
the injustice of the immunity rule had resulted in anomalies and incongruities in the law,2" the court proceeded to examine the various
reasons which had been given for it.
Quickly rejecting the maxim that the king can do no wrong as a
"rotten foundation" upon which the doctrine of sovereign immunity
rests,2" the court examined the "trust-fund" theory. In this regard the
court stated: "The public's willingness to stand up and pay the cost
of its enterprises carried out through municipal corporations is no less
than its insistence that individuals and groups pay the cost of their
enterprises. Tort liability is in fact a very small item in the budget
of any well organized enterprise."" The Illinois court abolished the
immunity of school districts, stating its belief that none of the reasons
usually advanced in support of sovereign immunity have any validity
today and that abolition of such immunity would cause school officials
to be more careful in training and supervising their bus drivers. The
broad language of this decision indicates its applicability to other subdivisions of the State of Illinois."
The second recent case which has apparently abolished sovereign
0 a 1961 Caliimmunity totally is Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist.,"
fornia decision. The court pointed out that while the legislature could
abolish sovereign immunity, since it was in the first instance courtmade, the court also had the power to abolish it. After evaluating the
doctrine, the court concluded that, "it must be discarded as mistaken
and unjust."'" The court further stated that:
None of the reasons for its continuance can withstand analysis. No
one defends total governmental immunity. In fact it does not exist. It
has become riddled with exceptions, both legislative ...

and judicial,

S.*.and the exceptions operate so illogically as to cause serious inequality. Some who are injured by governmental agencies can recover,
others cannot: one injured while attending a community theater in a
28

Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. App. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89,2 92 (1959).
7 The court discussed the history of the maxim, pointing out the absurdity of its
application modernly.
28 Id. at 95. The court quoted from Green, Freedom of Litigation, 38 ILL. L. REv.
355, 378 (1943).
29 In fact, the Illinois legislature immediately reacted to the Molitor decision by
passing statutes restoring immunity to counties, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 34, § 301.1 (1959) ;
park districts, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, § 3a (1959) ; and the Chicago Park District,
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 105, § 333.2a (1959). The liability of school districts and nonprofit private schools has also been limited to $10,000.00 by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
§§ 821-31 (1959). These statutes were drafted to apply retroactively. As to their effect
on Thomas Molitor's right to recover, see Note, 58 ILL. B.J. 549, 551-52 (1960).
80 11 Cal. Rep. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
11Id. at 91, 359 P.2d at 459.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

public park may recover .... but one injured in a children's playground
may not; . . . for torts committed in the course of a "governmental

function" there is no liability unless the tort be classified as a nuisance.
.

.

. The illogical and inequitable extreme is reached in this case: we

are asked to affirm a rule that denies recovery to one injured in a
county or hospital district hospital, although recovery may be had by
23
one injured in a city and county hospital.

In dealing with sovereign immunity, the Washington court has not
been willing to adopt the enlightened approach to stare decisis practiced
in the Hargrove, Molitor and Muskopf decisions." Thus the state and
its political subdivisions have enjoyed immunity in whole or in part in
accordance with a mass of confused rules and ponderous maxims.
While the state has not been liable in tort at all,34 certain of its subdivisions have been liable all of the time,3" certain of them have been
liable part of the time,3"and others have been liable none of the time.
Although the entire field of sovereign immunity is fraught with technicalities and absurd distinctions, perhaps the greatest problems arise
in connection with the tort liability of municipalities. Hagerman v. City
of Seattle,"8 a leading case, clearly states the rule:
A municipal corporation has a dual character and, consequently,
performs a dual function. In its first aspect, it is governmental, public,
or legislative; in its second, it is corporate, private, or proprietary....
[M] unicipalities are not liable for the negligence of their officers and
employees when engaged in the performance of governmental or public
duties, but are liable for their negligence when performing duties consequent upon 1 the
exercise, by the municipality, of its corporate or pri9
vate powers.

3

While this view is consistent with the law of the great majority of the
states,4" it is deceptive in its apparent simplicity. The Washington
Id. at 92, 359 P.2d at 460.
33 Florida, Illinois and California appear to stand alone in this regard. However, in
Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582, 585
(1957), it appeared that the Colorado court had abolished sovereign immunity, the
court boldly declaring: "In Colorado 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject for
discussion by students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge in this Court." However, the rule of that case has been limited to actions sounding in contract. Faber v.
State, 353 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960).
34 Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 67 Pac. 583 (1902).
35 Whiteside v. Benton County, 114 Wash. 463, 195 Pac. 519 (1921) (county).
36 Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152 (1937) (municipality).
37 Shimada v. Diking Dist. No. 12, 139 Wash. 168, 245 Pac. 916 (1926) (diking
district).
38 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152 (1937).
39 Id. at 696, 66 P.2d at 1153.
40 Id. at 697-98, 66 P.2d at 1154. "Despite these attacks, addressed to the foundation
qnd wisdom of the rule, the courts have, almost without exception, adhered to the precedent established by the decisions."
3
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court has pointed this out, saying: "[A]s many courts, including our
own, have from time to time declared, the difficulty lies not in the statement of the governing principles of law, but in their applications to
particular facts.""
It has often been stated that the ultimate test as to whether a certain
activity is governmental as opposed to proprietary, is whether it was
done for the benefit of all rather than for the mere advantage of the
municipality. 2 This distinction is meaningless. One would ordinarily
suppose that repairing streets is carried on for the benefit of all. Generally no special fee is imposed for such a service so that one has
difficulty in finding that it is done for the "mere advantage of the
municipality." In spite of this, in Washington street repair is held to
be a proprietary function. 3
Hoggard v. City of Richmond " presents a problem typical of those
which are often before the courts. In the Hoggard case the Virginia
court had to decide whether the operation of a free municipal swimming pool was a governmental or proprietary function. The court observed that nothing so promotes the public health as a supply of pure
water for domestic use, including swimming. " This would indicate that
the operation of the free pool was a governmental activity, being done
for the common good of all, rather than for corporate profit. But, the
court said, the operation of city waterworks is generally considered a
proprietary function 0 and it would be illogical to make a distinction
between the closely allied activities of furnishing water for domestic
purposes and furnishing water for public swimming. " Pointing out the
fact that the courts of other jurisdictions were in hopeless conflict on
the question, the court decided its case de novo. The court said that it
was "obviously" unsound to hold a municipality liable for furnishing
drinking water, but not for swimming water; therefore the city should
be liable for both. The operation of the swimming pool was held to be
a proprietary activity."
Because of frequent difficulties similar to those which confronted
the court in the Hoggard case, and because of the injustice of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, there has been a growing demand for
4

1 Id. at

698, 66 P.2d at 1154.
See id. at 701-03, 66 P2d at 1155-56.
43 Sutton v. City of Snohomish, 11 Wash. 24, 39 Pac. 273 (1895).
-- 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939).
42

45 Id. at 614.
446 Ibid.

7 Id. at 615.

48 Ibid
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legislation that would require the state and its political subdivisions to
bear the same responsibility for their torts as private parties." A
statute enacted at the 1961 session of the Washington legislature
should meet this demand, at least as far as liability of the state is
concerned.
NEW SECTION. Section 1. There is added to chapter 4.92 RCW
a new section to read as follows:
The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or
proprietary capacity, hereby consents to the maintaining of a suit or
action against it for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the
same extent as if it were a private person or corporation. The suit or
action shall be maintained in the county in which the cause of action
arises.5 o
This statute seems clearly to abolish the state's sovereign immunity.
In view of past Washington decisions, however, one cannot be certain
of this. Washington already has statutes which appear to abrogate
sovereign immunity, but they have not been so interpreted. For example, in Billings v. State,"' the court was confronted with the following statute: "Any person or corporation having any claim against the
state of Washington shall have the right to begin an action against the
52
state in the superior court of Thurston county.)

The court construed the above passage narrowly, holding that it did
not create any liability on the part of the state which had not existed
theretofore, but that it merely conferred jurisdiction upon the Thurston
county superior court to hear and determine suits against the state.
Similarly, in Howard v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10," faced with a
similar statute which clearly stated that incorporated towns would
enjoy no immunity, the court followed prior decisions and refused to
give effect to its words. The statute reads:
An action may be maintained against a county, or other of the public
corporations mentioned or described in RCW 4.08.110 [i.e., incorporated town, school district, or other public corporations of like character in this state], either upon a contract made by such county or
other public corporation in its corporate character, and within the
scope of its authority, or for injury to the right of the plaintiff arising
from some act or omission of such county or other public corporation. 4
49 This demand has been recognized by the Washington court in Kilbourn v. City of
Seattle, 43 Wn.2d 373, 376, 261 P.2d 407, 408 (1953).
50 Wash. SeRs. Laws 1961, ch. 136.
, 27 Wash. 288, 67 Pac. 583 (1902).

52RCW 4.92.010.
r1 88 Wash. 167, 152 Pac. 1004 (1915).
54 RCW 4.08.120.
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After an exhaustive analysis of the cases, the court pointed out that
under this analysis two lines of decisions had developed. In one of
these, dealing with incorporated cities and towns, the statute had-been
either denied or ignored. The governmental-proprietary dichotomy had
been followed. .But in the other, dealing with school districts .Iand
counties, the statute had been given effect and immunity abrogated
Careful drafting techniques employed in preparation of the new.
statute should insure a result different from those above. In the statute.
involved in the Billings case the venue provision was placed in the same
sentence as that concerning the claimant's right of action. In the pres'
ent statute the statement of venue is placed in a separate sentence from
that granting consent to be sued and thus the latter cannot be interpreted as only a venue provision. Also, the new statute clearly provides that the state consents to the maintenance of a suit. Both of the
statutes above provide, however, that one injured can begin or maintain an action. These words do not imply that the state is giving something new to the claimant which he did not have before, as strongly As
the word "consent." In like manner, the words "tortious conduct," appearing in the new statute seem to be more pointed than the words,
"act or omission," which appeared in the statute involved in the
Howard case. The draftsmen of the new statute, apparently to dispel
any further doubts with respect to its effect, have inserted a.provision
that the state "hereby consents to the maintaining of a suit or action
against it for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the-same
extent as if it were a private person or corporation" In view of this it
seems clear that the state will be liable for its tortious conduct. On the
other hand more serious problems will probably arise in connection
with litigation directed toward the applicability of the new statute to
political subdivisions of the state. The courts have been very-reluctant
to abrogate sovereign immunity in the absence of clearly expressed
legislative direction. They apparently require very specific .wordipg
before they will construe a statute as one limiting sovereign immunity.
An example of this ultra-conservative approach to the interpretation
of sovereign immunity statutes is afforded by the California court's
treatment of a statute which appeared on its face to create state tort
liability. The statute provides: "Any person who has a claim against
the state (1) on express contract, (2) for negligence, or (3) for the
taking or damaging of private property for public use... may bring
55 Howard v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 147, 178, 152 Pac. 1004, 1007
(1915).
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an action against the state on the claim and prosecute it to final judgment."' 6 The California court has held that while under the above
statute the state consents to be sued for negligence, it does not waive
its immunity from tort liability."
The California experience is not unusual. In a recent study, 8 after
a comprehensive survey of the law of all of the states, the authors concluded that "... enactment of statutes authorizing suits against the

state or its subdivisions by all persons having claims against them has
very little bearing upon tort liability or responsibility."59 The authors
further observed that in those jurisdictions where there has been a
general waiver of immunity it has usually been held to apply only to
the state and its agencies, and not to its lesser political subdivisions."
A notable exception is the treatment which has been given the New
York statute, a statute somewhat similar to that recently passed in
Washington. The New York statute provides as follows:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and
hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in
accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the
supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article ....'
It is logical that this statute should abrogate the immunity of political subdivisions of the state such as municipalities, since their immunity
only exists as a derivative of the state's immunity.62 In fact, as the
Washington court has observed in a case involving the liability of a
municipality, the whole reason for the governmental-proprietary distinction, and for liability being dependent thereon, is that in performing governmental functions the municipality is said to be acting for
the state, whereas in the performance of proprietary functions it is said
to be acting for itself." Holmes v. Erie County,64 illustrative of other
New York decisions involving the immunity of political subdivisions of
the state, follows this approach:
The immunity of a county from liability for acts performed in a gov*6CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16041.
07 See People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1, 4 (1947).
58 Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363 (1954).
59 Id. at 1408. For an excellent discussion of the extremes to which some courts
have gone in order to interpret away some of the statutes, see 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATrE LAW

§ 25.06 (1958).

God.at 1411.
63 N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8.
62 See Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 11, at 1411.
G3 Simpson v. City of Whatcom, 33 Wash. 392, 395-96, 74 Pac. 577, 578 (1903).
64 266 App. Div. 220, 42 N.Y.S.2d. 243 (1943).
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ernmental capacity is not an immunity inherent in the county itself but
is derived from the historical immunity of the sovereign State.... It is
a civil division of the State to which has been delegated the power to
exercise certain of the functions of the State itself in the interest of all
the people of the State .... The source of the immunity is in the sovereign power of the State .... 65 If the immunity of the State is destroyed, as stated in Bloom v. Jewish Board Guardians,supra, there is
not basis for holding that the county, as a civil division of the State, is
still immune. The sovereign State itself not being immune, there is no
immunity to a civil division of the State.66
There is a slight difference in wording which may make the Washington statute not amenable to this kind of reasoning. While the New
York statute provides generally that the state "waives immunity," the
Washington statute provides only that the state consents to suit for
damages arising out of its tortious conduct. The word, "its" could be
interpreted either in a restrictive sense or in a definitive sense.
A restrictive interpretation of a similar statute is afforded by the
New York court's treatment of the statute which preceded the present
New York statute. That statute provided:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability for the torts of
its officers and employees and consents to have its liability for such
torts determined in accordance with the same rules of law as apply to
an action in the supreme court against an individual or a corporation,
and the 7state hereby assumes liability for such acts . . . (Emphasis
6
added.)
The courts held that it was clear that sovereign immunity was only
waived in the case of the torts of its (the state's) officers and employees,
and the statute did not apply to political subdivisions of the state.68
While the Washington court could interpret the "its" in the Washington statute to mean that the consent to suit operates only on its (the
state's) tort liability, just as the New York court did, such a result
need not follow. The word, "its" could be construed definitively, as
part of the phrase, "its tortious conduct," a phrase modifying, explaining, and defining what kind of suit it is that the state consents to. With
such an interpretation the consent to suit on the state level, since not
expressly restricted to the state level, would then apply to the state's
political subdivisions."9
65
Id. at 244-45.
6
0 Id. at 245.

67 N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 12-A.
68 See Engels v. City of New York, 256 App. Div. 992, 10 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1939).
65

See the discussion accompanying note 64 supra.
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Thus it would appear that the court could follow a literal interpretation of the Washington statute and still be free to select either of
two opposite positions. This freedom is further reinforced by the fact
that the courts usually ignore the wording of sovereign immunity
statutes anyway.7" Witness, for example, the extremes to which the
California court went in protecting the doctrine of sovereign immunity
when faced with a statute seemingly abolishing it,7 and then how only
a few years later it completely abolished it without the aid of a
statute at all."
New York's first statute was enacted in 1929 while the present one
was enacted ten years later. Perhaps an important reason for the
court's interpreting the present one to apply to political subdivisions
of the state was the passage of ten years and a correspondingly changed
attitude toward sovereign immunity. Certainly in Duren v. City of
Binghamton,7 a 1939 decision handed down just before the enactment
of the new statute, the court criticized sovereign immunity, saying:
Although abolished in many particulars by statutory enactment, the
ancient and medieval rule that the sovereign can do no wrong still persists where the exercise of governmental powers and functions by a
municipal corporation is involved. The doctrine of non-liability of
municipal corporations, even in the exercise of governmental functions, has been seriously questioned and condemned. (Here the court
quoted from such a statement by the United States Supreme Court.)
The present tendency is against the rule of non-liability .... The modern tendency to abolish the fiction that the sovereign can do no wrong
is illustrated not only by the comments of eminent jurists and the discussions of learned expositors of the law, but is reflected in statutory
enactments .... 74
The Washington court too, has demonstrated dissatisfaction with the
doctrine. The court has observed that there have been great difficulties
in deciding whether acts are governmental or proprietary," that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity has been vigorously criticized,7 and
that it at times causes great injustice. 7 In fact, very recently Judge

Finley made the following comment:
In what appears to the writer of the opinion in the case at bar to be
70 See the discussion accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
71 See the discussion accompanying note 55 supra.
72 See note 27 supra.
73

172 Misc. 580, 15 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1939).

74 Id. at 521.

75 Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 698, 66 P.2d 1152, 1154 (1937).
76 Kilbourn v. City of Seattle, 43 Wn.2d 373, 375-76, 261 P.2d 407, 408 (1953).
7 Id. at 385, 261 P.2d at 413.
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an enlightened and forthright judicial re-evaluation and restatement of
the law . . . the Florida court abrogated the doctrine of municipal
immunity .... 78 In doing so, the court emphasized the judicial origin

of the doctrine, saying specifically, "we can see no necessity for insisting
on legislative action in a matter which the courts themselves have
originated. (Emphasis added.)79
Furthermore, in Piercev. fakima Valley Memorial HospitalAss'n,s0
the Washington court abolished 81 the doctrine of charitable immunity
without statutory permission. The court said that it was convinced that
none of the reasons usually given for its support are valid today. Yet
these theories are very similar to those often urged in support of
sovereign immunity. 2 While the court has not been willing to go so
far as to abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the absence
of statute, it has indicated its willingness to do so if confronted with
one. 8 Perhaps there is some indication, then, that the court is disposed
to abolish sovereign immunity altogether provided that it has license to
do so. It is certain that Washington's new statute does provide this
license.
Whether it is decided that the Washington statute applies only to
the state or that in addition it applies to the state's political subdivisions, there will be many other difficult problems connected with its
interpretation. They can be mentioned only briefly in the present
discussion.
DiscretionaryFunctions. One of these problems will be whether a
"discretionary functions" exception to liability is to be read into the
act. The Federal Tort Claims Act specifically provides that there shall
be no liability in the case of a claim based upon the exercise or failure
to exercise a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or employee.8 Even though such an exception is not specifically
78 Judge Finley was referring to Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130
(Fla. 1957), discussed in the text following note 20 supra.
79 Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wn.2d 317, 320, 324
P.2d 1099, 1101 (1958).

80 43 Wn.2d 162, 260 P2d 765 (1953).
81

However, Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free Church, 47 Wn2d 202, 287 P.2d
128 (1955), a later case, may have limited the Pierce case severely.
82 Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 11, at 1364 point out that there are three main
reasons why courts have refused to abolish sovereign immunity: "(1) an amorphous

mass of cumbrous language .

.

. (2) legislative and judicial inertia.

.

. (3) financial

fears ... ." In the Pierce case the court ignored the first, overcame the second, and
attacked the third.
s3 Kilbourn v. City of Seattle, 43 Wn.2d 373, 376, 261 P.2d 407, 408 (1953). "[T]he
rule of governmental immunity has become so firmly fixed as a part of the law,...
that it is not to be disregarded by the courts until the legislature announces a change
in public policy."
8428 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1958).
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stated on the face of the Washington statute, one will undoubtedly be
read into it. The New York act, like the Washington statute, does not
specifically contain a discretionary functions exception, but the New
York courts have held that the state is not liable for failure to extinguish fires," failure to maintain signals properly,8 6 failure to make or
enforce certain laws,"7 or failure to properly exercise a judicial or quasijudicial power."s While the Washington court may not choose to follow
all of the New York decisions, it would be unthinkable, for example, to
hold the state liable for the wrong decision of a judge or legislator.
To do so would unduly discourage the fearless exercise of their public
duties and perhaps seriously obstruct certain governmental operations.8 9
Of course many activities are in part discretionary and in part
ministerial. There will be considerable difficulty in characterizing some
of these activities as one or the other and the New York and federal
decisions furnish only a rough guide as to where the line probably will
be drawn.9"
Liability Without Fault. The Washington court has found liability
without negligence in the case of "ultrahazardous activities," such as
blasting. 9 However, if the court should follow a generally restrictive
approach to the interpretation of the new statute, perhaps the principle
of absolute liability will be held not to apply to the sovereign.
The statute provides that the state consents to the maintaining of a
suit for damages arising out of its "tortious conduct." While one often
thinks of the word, "tortious," as being synonomous with "wrongful,"
literally the term, "tortious conduct," should mean "conduct for which
there is liability in tort." This would encompass the principle of absolute liability, as would the further statement that the state shall be
liable to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.
In addition it could be argued that if the legislature had meant to avoid
85 Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).

Foley v. State, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945).
Murrian v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1946), af'd, 296
N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947).
88 Farrell v. State, 204 Misc. 148, 123 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1953) ; Fishbein v. State, 282
App. Div. 600, 125 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1953) ; Haslam v. State, 167 Misc. 455, 4 N.Y.S.2d
59 (1938).
89 The immunity of public officials from private tort liability is predicated on such a
basis. Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913) ; Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
See 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 26.01 (1958).
90 For a discussion of general tort principles governing this problem see Peck, The
Federal Tort Claimns Act-A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Function
Exception, 31 WAsH. L. Rav. 207 (1956).
91 Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wn.2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954).
86
87
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absolute liability it would have used some term more clearly embodying the concept of wrongfulness such as "wrongful act or omission.9 2
Intentional Torts. State liability for the intentional torts of its employees or agents may also be a problem under the new statute.
Liability for certain intentional torts is specifically excepted from the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Neither the Washington nor the New York
statutes mention it at all but in New York the state is held liable for
intentional torts committed by its agents and employees. 8 This is the
result of the application of the regular rules of respondeat superior"'
which include liability of the master for the intentional tort of his
servant, 5 provided the acts were within the scope of the servant's employment." Washington too recognizes liability of the master for the
servant's intentional torts,9 7 and it is to be expected that this principle
will be applied where the master is sovereign.
Other Problems. In addition to those major problems briefly discussed above, there will of course be an interminable number of other
problems. What rights of indemnity and contribution will the state have
against its negligent employee? May a prisoner in a state prison recover for injuries suffered due to the negligence of a prison employee?
If he may not, may he do so after his release? May a state employee
maintain a suit against the state for on-the-job injuries?
The following situation is illustrative of the many problems that
will arise in the case of activities carried on jointly by two different
governmental units, one of which may retain immunity while the
other does not: Until now, even though counties are liable for their
negligent acts whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, presumably the superior courts have been immune from tort liability because they are "state" courts. But under the new statute if a
juror, for example, were injured he would have the right to sue the
9

2 E.g., the Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the United States shall be liable
only in the case of a "negligent or wrongful act or omission." Because of this wording it has been stated that there is no absolute liability under the act. Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1959). However, there is considerable controversy over
whether this is now the law. For a recent discussion of absolute liability under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, see Note, 36 WASH. L. REV. 229 (1961).
9 In Nephew v. State, 178 Misc. 824, 36 N.Y.S2d 541 (1942), the state was held
liable for assault by a state trooper upon an Indian within the Alleghany Indian Reservation when making an unlawful arrest without a warrant. See also, Egan v. State,
255 App. Div. 825, 7 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1938) ; Dailey v. State, 190 Misc. 542, 75 N.Y.S.2d
40 (1947).
4McCrossen v. State, 277 App. Div. 1160, 101 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1950).
95 Muller v. Hillenbrand, 277 N.Y. 448, 451, 125 N.E. 808 (1920).
96 While the willfulness of the tort does not relieve the master from liability, under
the more modem decisions it is less likely that a willful tort will be held to be in the
scope
of employment than a non-willful one. MEcHEM, AGENCY § 394 (1952).
9
7 Blomsness v. Puget Sound Elec. Ry., 47 Wash. 620, 92 Pac. 414 (1907).
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state and recover. But his recovery will have to be from the county
because the county is responsible for all the costs of the court,9" except
part of the judge's salary."'
Administrative problems may have to be overcome in addition to
these substantive problems. For example, even if the statute is held
not to apply to political subdivisions of the state, there may be so
many tort judgments entered against the state that the present claims
procedure will be unable efficiently to handle the increased load. At the
present time, in order to obtain satisfaction of a judgment against the
state, an attorney fills out a state voucher form and files it, together
T
with a copy of the judgment in the office of the state auditor. 10
Upon
receipt of the voucher and copy of the judgment, the state auditor
forwards such claims to the appropriate subcommittee of the appropriations committee. Claims are usually handled by the subcommittee
on claims of the appropriations committee writing the supplemental
appropriation bill. Generally, claims for judgments against the state
have been approved.'
This rather involved procedure may prove inadequate. Perhaps a
better approach would be to make an appropriation to the attorney
general's office or the state treasurer for the payment of judgments.
At any rate, the Legislative Budget Committee has been directed to
review the present claims procedure to determine its adequacy." 2
If the court chooses to interpret Washington's sovereign immunity
statute broadly, it will prove to be a most significant piece of legislation.
The court has considerable latitude and can pursue any course it
chooses because of the equivocal wording of the statute, however.
Certainly legislation such as this is rare; injured tort claimants do
not form an organized lobby. Therefore, if the court should interpret
this statute too narrowly, corrective legislation probably would not be
forthcoming. On the other hand, the state and its political subdivisions
are quite effectively organized as lobbies, and would see to it that an
unduly broad construction of the statute was soon corrected. With this
98 RCW 2.28.139.
99 WASR. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
100 This can be done at any time; however, the legislature customarily stops process-

ing claims about half way through the session, and all claims made after this time have
to be carried over until the next session of the legislature. Letter from John R. Minkler
of the office of the Legislative Budget Committee, to the author, June 6, 1961.
101 Letter, supra note 100.
102 Letter, supra note 100. In New York a very simple procedure has been provided
whereby the state's controller, upon the consent of the attorney general, may pay such
portion of the judgment of the court from which appeal has not been taken by the
state. N.Y. CT.CL. AcT § 20.
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in mind, the court ought to construe the new statute liberally, placing
Washington among the forerunners of those states abolishing the almost
universally condemned doctrine of sovereign immunity.
CHARuEs F. ABBOTT, JR.

Parental Liability for Wilful and Malicious Acts of Children.
Parents of a child who is under the age of eighteen and living with-the
parents have been made liable in an amount not to exceed three hundred dollars for the wilful or malicious destruction of property by the
child.' The new statute appears to have been adopted not out of consideration for providing a restorative compensation for the victims of
injurious or tortious conduct of children, but as an aid in the control
of juvenile delinquency. Thus, the limitation of liability to wilful and
malicious acts as well as the limitation to liability for the destruction
of property fail to serve any of the general compensatory objectives of
tort law. Likewise, limitation of recovery to $300 has established a
maximum which will seldom justify litigation as a rational attempt
to recoup a loss suffered.
Considered as a measure to combat the problems of juvenile delinquency, the wisdom of the statute is at least debatable. Its rationale
apparently is that parental indifference and failure to supervise the
activities of children is one of the major causes of juvenile delinquency;
that parental liability for harm done by children will stimulate attention and supervision; and that the total effect will be a reduction in
the anti-social behavior of children. Indeed, a report on Michigan
experience has attributed to a similar statute a drop in cases of malicious destruction of property of twenty per cent in the Detroit area
and as much as fifty per cent in outlying areas.2 That a change in a
single factor would produce such wide variations in results appears so
doubtful that one is led to believe that the analysis of the operative
factors was not adequate, and that the statite has been credited with
more than it accomplished.
An underlying assumption of the legislation is that parents, indifferent to the current activities of their children, have a sufficient interest in the law to be familiar with the limitations of the existing rules
I Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 99. The statute in its entirety is as follows: "Section 1.
The parent or parents of any minor child under the age of eighteen years who is living
with the parent or parents and who shall willfully or maliciously destroy property, real
or personal or mixed, shall be liable to the owner of such property in a civil action at
law for damages in an amount not to exceed three hundred dollars. This section shall
in no way limit the amount of recovery against the parent or parents for their own
common law negligence."
2 Whitman, Michigan Puts it Up to the Parents, Readers Digest, Mar. 1956, p. 161.
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concerning their liability for consequences of those activities. It is
further assumed that those indifferent parents, informed of the change
made by the legislature, will undertake their responsibilities of instruction and supervision of their children. Extension of the hypothesis
concerning such law-oriented parents leads to the unhappy conclusion
that the instruction will be restricted to inculcation Qf respect for the
rights in property, "rel or personal or mixed," but will neglect society's
interest in providing protection from injurious or offensive contacts or
from other insults and indignities, and that likewise neglected will be
instruction concerning careless or negligent conduct. Scepticism concerning the underlying assumptions appears justified.
If it is assumed, however, that enactment of the law will affect the
conduct of parents, support for the statute might be sought in the
findings of the foremost investigators of juvenile delinquency, Eleanor
and Sheldon Glueck. Their studies indicate that there is a substantial
correlation between lax standards of discipline and delinquency.'
Their studies also indicate, however, a substantial correlation between
overly strict discipline and delinquency." Thus, if the statute has the
desirable effect of raising lax standards of discipline, it can reasonably
be expected to have undesirable offsetting effects of causing overly strict
discipline. The statute might have the effect of directing the attention
of parents of a juvenile who has become delinquent to their responsibilities concerning the child, but in this respect it has aspects of that
well-known remedy of locking the door after the horse has been stolen.
Moreover, if it is sound policy to grant parents immunity from liability
to children for torts because of the effects which litigation might have
upon domestic tranquility,' it would appear that this statutory imposition of liability on the parents will have a similar disruptive effect upon
domestic tranquility. If this effect is to create hostility or to lessen the
affection of the parents for the child, it will, according to the findings
of the Gluecks,6 operate to strengthen rather than weaken the factors
causing delinquency. The state of Wisconsin, for reasons which do not
immediately appear, recently repealed a very similar statute.7
3 GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
PREDICTING DELINQUENCY AND CRIME 16, 190-99, 244
4 Ibid.

130-33, 280 (1950);
(1959).

GLUECK,

5 Cf. Delay v. Delay, 54 Wn.2d 63, 337 P.2d 1057 (1959) ; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn.2d
642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
6 GLUECK, PREDICTING DELINQUENCY AND CRIME 28 (1959).

7 Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 562, § 2 m, repealing WIs. STAT. ANN. § 331.035.
Parental
liability laws were recently subjected to severe criticism in a panel discussion at the

National Council of Juvenile Court Judges. The Seattle Times, June 28, 1961, p. 9,
col. 2.
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Despite these doubts concerning the effectiveness of the statute, the
changes in the existing law effected by the legislation must be considered. Washington has followed the common law rule that a parent is
not liable for the torts of his child solely because of the parent-child
relationship.' However, in a decision which gained some prominence,9
the Washington court has held that the parents of a child might be
liable for their negligence in "upholding" and failing to correct a dangerous habit of the child of which they had notice. Parents may also
be held liable for entrusting a dangerous instrumentality such as a gun
to a child10 and the principle would seem to carry to the imposition of
liability where the dangerousness comes from the habits and disposition
of the child rather than from the instrument. 1 The element of "upholding" the child's misconduct was not mentioned in a more recent
case in which liability was recognized for failure to warn a stranger of
the child's dangerous propensities."2 Perhaps, as Prosser suggests,"
liability would not be imposed unless the parent had an opportunity to
correct, warn, or give protection from a specific propensity of the child,
thus eliminating liability for a general incorrigibility and bad disposition. The family car doctrine provides a route for imposition of liability
on parents if the injuries are caused by negligent driving of the child,'"
but, as recently held, this doctrine cannot be applied where the automobile involved has been purchased by a partially emancipated minor
from his own savings.' Nor is the doctrine applicable to bicycles or,
apparently, to other vehicles which have not become sufficiently injurious to create a social problem. 6 Of course, parents may also be held
8
Pflugmacher v. Thomas, 34 Wn2d 687, 209 P.2d 443 (1949). See Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 491, 133 Pac. 1020, 1022 (1913) ; Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash.
241, 245, 281 Pac. 991, 992 (1929). For a discussion of cases generally, see 1 HARPER
& JA E , TORTS 657-64 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 680-81, § 102 (2d ed. 1955). See also
Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control The Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 89395 (1934). The civil law, unlike the common law, does recognize parental liability for
damage caused by minor children. For a discussion of the history as well as the current variations of the civil law rules, see Stone, Liability for Damage Caused by Minors:
A Comparative Study, 5 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1952). See also Kenny & Kenny, Shall We
Punish the Parents,47 A.B.A.J. 804 (1961).
9 Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929), noted 30 CoLuM. L. Rv.
269 (1930) ; 28 MicH. L. REv. 627 (1930).
'0 Schatter v. Bergen, 185 Wash. 375, 55 P.2d 344 (1936).
"1HARPER & JAmEs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 663 ; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 682.
12 Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wn.2d 678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960).
13 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 682. Cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 316, comment

b (1934).
14 Jerdal v. Sinclair, 54 Wn.2d 565, 342 P.2d 585 (1959) ; Birch v. Abercrombie, 74
Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913).
'- Foran v. Kallio, 156 Wash. Dec. 743, 355 P.2d 544 (1960). But cf. Robinson v.
Ebert, 180 Wash. 387, 39 P.2d 992; noted 10 WASH. L. REv. 178 (1935).
26 Pflugmacher v. Thomas, 34 Wn.2d 687, 209 P.2d 443 (1949).
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liable on an agency basis if the injuries were caused by the child while
acting in the course of employment for his parents." And, the victims
of tortious conduct of children may also obtain compensation from insurance provided by the parents in the form of the comprehensive
homeowners' policy. 8
Some unfortunately vague and ambiguous language of the statute
will undoubtedly raise problems of construction. Although similar
statutes have recently been adopted in over twenty other states, 9 little
assistance can be expected from appellate decisions of those jurisdictions for the reason that the limited amounts involved would seldom
justify the expenditure necessary for appeal. For a similar reason, the
trial courts in this state will probably have to deal with the problems
created by the statute without the guidance of supreme court decisions.
The first problem of construction arises with the second word of the
statute, which contains no definition of who is a "parent." The purpose
to be served by the law would seem to require its application to parents
who have adopted children. Whether a stepparent or relatives or others
standing in loco parentis are subject to the liabilities created remains
to be determined. Likewise uncertain is what constitutes "living with
the parent or parents." There would seem little reason to refuse to
apply the statute to the parents of a child whose wilful and malicious
misconduct occurs while the child is away at a camp or a boarding
school. More likely to arise, considering the coincidence of delinquency
and divorce" of the parents, are the problems created where a custody
decree provides for prolonged visitation periods, or a change of custody
at periodic intervals.
17 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 8, at 660; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 681.
'8 The comprehensive personal responsibility protection of the homeowners' policy
covers not only the named policy holder, but his or her spouse, the relatives of either
spouse living in the household, and all persons under twenty-one years of age living
in the household. Although the standard policy excludes coverage for damage or
injuries caused intentionally or at the direction of the insured, vicarious liabilities of
the insured, such as those imposed by the statute, as well as liabilities for negligent
failure to restrain the child or warn the victim, appear to be covered. See Arenson v.
National Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal.2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955).
19 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-661; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-109 (Supp. 1960) ; CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (Supp. 1960) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 (Supp. 1959) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 45.20 (Supp. 1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 6-210 (Supp. 1961) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-520 (Burns Supp. 1961) ; LA. CIv. CODE
arts. 237, 2318; MICH. COMPILED LAWS, § 692.661 (Masons Supp. 1956) ; MONT. REV.
CODE § 61-112.1 (Supp. 1961); NFH. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1960); NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 41.470; N.M. STAT. ANN. 22-21-1
PAGES OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.41.1

(Supp. 1959); N. DAK. CENT. CODE § 32.03.39;
(Supp. 1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10

(Supp. 1960); R.I.

GEN. LAWS

TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 37.1001-37.1003

(1956)

§ 9-1-3; S. Dak. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 41;
(Supp. 1961); TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 5923-1
(Vernon Supp. 1960) ; W. VA. CODE § 5482 (2) (3) (Supp. 1960).
20 GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

90-91 (1950).
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The greatest difficulties have been created by the use of the unfortunate limitation to cases in which the child has "willfully or maliciously"
destroyed property. Presumably those words limit liability to less than
intentional tortious conduct, for which a child may be held liable in
Washington at an early age." Accidental injury, or a negligently inflicted injury will not be the subject of compensation under the statute,
because they lack that element of knowingness or recklessness." The
question accordingly arises of at what age a child is capable of entertaining willful or malicious motives. If the analogy of the criminal law
is adopted, a Washington statute23 offers a solution by which children
under the age of eight would be deemed incapable of such conduct, and
children between the ages of eight and twelve would be presumed to be
incapable, but the presumption could be rebutted. If the statute is
viewed, as has been here suggested, as a supplement to the laws governing juvenile delinquency, the selection of a lower age limit of eight
years is supported by another statute governing the commitment of
juvenile offenders.2"
Fortunately, the last sentence of the statute eliminates one possible
problem of an implied repeal by expressly providing that the statute
does not limit the amount of recovery against the parents for their own
common law negligence. Though they are unmentioned, this should be
sufficient manifestation of a legislative purpose of saving all other bases
for imposition of liability on the parents.
CoRNELI S J. PECK

Survival of Actions. Chapter 1371 is a complete revision of the law
relating to the survival of actions in Washington. Briefly stated, it
provides (1) That all causes of action shall survive whether for or
against the decedent, provided that no damages shall be recovered "for
pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation personal
to and suffered by a deceased...";2 (2) That if a cause so surviving is
a claim enforceable against property held as community property, or is
an asset of the community of spouses, it shall continue enforceable
against such property or collectible as a community asset despite the
Garrat v. Dailey, 46 Wn2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
Cf. Bidlake v. Youell, Inc., 51 Wn2d 59, 315 P.2d 644 (1957) ; State v. Evans,
32 Wn.2d 278, 201 P.2d 513 (1949) ; Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 13
Wn.2d 485, 125 P.2d 681 (1942). See also the definition of malice found in RCW
9.01.010(3).
2
3 RCW 9.01.111.
24 RCW 13.08.080.
21
22

I Wash.

Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 137.

2Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 137, § 1(1).
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death of either or both spouses; (3) That where death or injury to
person or property results from the wrongful act, neglect, or default of
another, and occurs simultaneously with or after the death of a person
who would be liable if his death had not been simultaneous with the
harm, or had not intervened between the wrongful act and the harm,
an action to recover damages may be maintained against the personal
representative of that person.
By this statute, the state has swung full circle in a span of 92 years,
and occupies a position with respect to the survival of actions which is
in essentials that established by the territorial legislature in 1869.'
That statute was defeated by the court,4 in a superbly outrageous exercise of judicial legislation, but the draftsmen of the new statute have
gone to considerable effort to save it from a similar fate. It is provided
that "all causes of action ...shall survive ...whether such actions

arise on contract or otherwise, and whether or not such actions would
have survived at the common law or prior to the date of enactment of
this act.

.

.

,"'

and with this phrasing it is difficult to see what could be

done to limit survival even assuming in these days a wish to try. The
proviso denying survival to claims which are often thought of as being
"personal" to the deceased, i.e., which represent no actual money loss
to him, which are translatable into money value only on the basis that
to do so will punish the defendant, and on no other intelligible premise,
was possibly inserted to pacify insurance carriers but is eminently
sensible in itself. It has become the fashion to accept almost without
question the monetary evaluation of what has been called "the immeasurable perturbations of the spirit";' if these have no real monetary dimensions among the living, how much less among the dead.
The provisions relating to community property in effect keep the
community a going concern so far as claims for or against it survive
the death of either or both spouses, and while it is possible that the
3Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws 1869, ch. 58, § 659.
4 Slauson v. Schwabacher Bros., 4 Wash. 783, 31 Pac. 329 (1892). The case involved the assignability of a chose in action, not survival, but the court seemed unable
to separate the problems. The explanation for the result limiting survival to causes
which have survived at the common law: the legislature did not purport to say what
causes survived, but only who should sue on those which did. This is odd; a statement
that "all ...causes of action survive" does not say what causes survive? See 28 WASH.
L. REv. 201 (1953).
5 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 137, § 1(1).
6Jaffee, Damages for PersonalInjury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 222-25 (1953). It is recognized that there are all shades of opinion as
to the propriety of allowing recovery for such things, but all hands must agree that
there can be nothing resembling a "measure of damages" for them in any sense in which
the phrase is used in other connections.
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same results might have been reached without the provision, its inclusion removes all doubt.7
Subsection 2 of the act saves to the plaintiff, or to the personal representative of a decedent, those causes of action for injuries caused by a
wrongdoer who died simultaneously with or prior to their infliction.
Without this, the cause of action would depend upon pure chance,
which is a result supportable neither in reason nor justice; 8 its application will be particularly important in wrongful death by automobile
cases, where both drivers are killed on impact. Under the former rule,
since no cause of action arose during the lifetime of the tort feasor,
none could survive his death; this provision preserves to the personal
representative of each driver, for what it is worth, the cause of action
under RCW 4.20.010.
The act specifically repeals the miscellaneous survival acts which
preceded it: RCW 4.20.040, the general survival act whose place it
takes; RCW 4.20.045, having to do with the death of a tort feasor,
now fortunately beyond the need for discussion; a pair of sections from
the probate code, RCW 11.48.100-110, providing actions by or against
an estate for waste, trespass, conversion. A proviso saves to suitors all
causes arising under the repealed statutes prior to their effective date
of repeal.
Finally, it should be noted that this new act does not affect the operation of RCW 4.20.060, which provides for the survival for the benefit
of the same group of beneficiaries who take under the wrongful death
act "[an] action for a personal injury to any person occasioning his
death...." Absent a qualifying beneficiary, there is no survival, and
of course by its terms the surviving cause can never exist independently
of the action for wrongful death.
JOHN W. R
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The statutory language of the session laws of Title 51, RCW, is
codified as title 51 by chapter 23.1 This means, of course, that the
language of this title is now the official language of the statute law, and
reference to earlier session laws is unnecessary.
In addition to this legislation of general significance, specific statutes
were enacted amending the Industrial Insurance Title in these ways:
7See 28 WAsH. L. REv. 201-02 (1953).
81d. at 203. This subsection is almost identical with that in the New York act,
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'Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 23.

